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I. INTRODUCTION
Literary phrases are common targets for appropriation. They
are easily severable from larger works and can be used for a range
of commercial purposes.2 In order to prevent appropriation, the
creator or popularizer of a literary phrase may try to protect the
phrase under copyright.' In order to prove that a work, such as a
* © 1990 Richard W. Stim
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor J. Thomas McCarthy,
Ronald Townsend, and Ashleigh Brilliant for their comments.
1. For purposes of this Article, a literary phrase is a brief sequence of words or sylla-
bles, generally spoken or- read as a unit, i.e., "Where's the beef.," "Make my day," "Beam
Me Up, Scotty," "Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the water .... Literary
phrases appear in literary works, musical compositions, motion pictures, audio-visual works,
dramatic works, and other copyrightable subject matter.
2. One common commercial use of phrases is on merchandise. E.g., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Industries, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("E.T.
Phone Home" used on drinking mugs and pencil sharpeners). See infra notes 77-86 and
accompanying text. Another common use of phrases is for promotion or advertising. E.g.,
D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc. 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 19"79) (phrase
"Look! ... Up in the sky!... It's a bird!... It's a plane . . .It's Crazy Eddie!" used in
advertising for discount chain). Phrases also are taken for their "literary" value. E.g., Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1007 (1967) (television network appropriated plaintiff's phrase "Have Gun Will Travel").
3. According to one source, Joan Rivers has a "battery of lawyers working on getting a
copyright for her famous phrase, 'Can we talk?'" 20 Things You Never Knew About Joan
Rivers, STAR, Sept. 16, 1986, at 23.
1
Stim: E.T. Phone Home: The Protection of Literary Phrases
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
66 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
biography, has been appropriated, the plaintiff in an infringement
action may aggregate similar phrases in the defendant's work.4 Al-
ternatively, an author may prove infringement based on the taking
of only one phrase.8
A claim for protection on a literary phrase, however, is viewed
with suspicion. Copyright Office Regulations state that "[w]ords
and short phrases such as names, titles and slogans" are not sub-
ject to copyright.' These regulations are premised on two tenets of
copyright law. First, copyright will not protect an idea. Phrases
conveying an idea typically expressed in a limited number of ways,
therefore, are not subject to copyright protection." Second, phrases
are considered as common idioms of the English language and are
therefore free to all.9 Granting a monopoly would eventually
4. Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (verbatim use of 37
phrases from a biography of Oscar Wilde constituted a substantial appropriation). But cf.
Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (copying of 89 passages-or 3,500
words-from a biography of Stravinsky excused as fair use); Leeds Music Ltd. v. Robin, 358
F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (finding the presence of several vaguely similar phrases re-
lated to life of Jesus Christ was not an infringement). See also Did Hersey Borrow From
Agee Bio?, Naw YORK, July 25, 1988, at 9 (author John Hersey admits borrowing a dozen
words from another author's biography of James Agee. Hersey stated, "[Ijt's not that I bor-
rowed his words but that those were the right words for the circumstances.").
5. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (protecting "E.T. Phone Home"); Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 831 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (protecting "When there is no room in hell... the dead will walk
the earth"); Brilliant v. W.B. Prods., Inc., Civ. No. 79-1893-WMB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1979)
(protecting "I may not be totally perfect but parts of me are excellent" and "I have aban-
doned my search for truth and am now looking for a good fantasy").
6. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1988). Although "the publication of these views does not have
the force of statute, it is a fair summary of the law." Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty
Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959). Courts also applied this regulation under the
Copyright Act of 1909. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.01[B] (1988). The view
that a literary phrase or slogan is per se unprotectable has been criticized as "inaccurate and
unsupportable." I J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:5 (2d ed. 1984).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Section 102(b) provides, in pertinent part: "In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea ... regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("[C]opyright law simply does not create any property interest in infor-
mation and ideas.").
8. Narrell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989).
9. This view is derived from the Supreme Court's holding in Holmes v. Hurst that
"words are the common property of the human race and are as little susceptible of private
appropriation as air or sunlight." Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899). See also Signo
Trading Int'l., Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("It is conceivable
that anyone could copyright a single word or a commonly used short phrase, in any lan-
guage."); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("[Clommon phrases are generally not susceptible to copyright protection."); Norman v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 788, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("It is clear that
mere similarity of phraseology does not amount to an infringement since copyright does not
[Vol. 7:65
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"checkmate the public"10 and the purpose of the copyright
clause-to encourage creativity t1-would be defeated.
Litigation surrounding literary phrases clusters in several situ-
ations: (1) One or more phrases are aggregated as proof of substan-
tial similarity; (2) a phrase is appropriated for its associative com-
mercial power; (3) an author asserts a proprietary right to a public
domain phrase; (4) an author seeks to protect a singular literary
phrase; (5) an author invents a language and then seeks to protect
phrases within that language; (6) an author affirmatively defends
the appropriation of a phrase or group of phrases as a fair use; or
(7) an author affirmatively defends the appropriation of a phrase
or group of phrases as a parody. In order to frame each of these
caselaw clusters, this Article will utilize a series of hypotheticals
based upon the most well-protected literary phrase of the past dec-
ade - "E.T. Phone Home." ' .
In conclusion, this survey will prove that the protection of lit-
erary phrases is dependent upon the way in which both plaintiff
protect words and phrases as such."); O'Brien v. Chappel & Co., 159 F. Supp. 58, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("Such a common phrase [night and noon] in and of itself is not susceptible
of copyright, nor of appropriation by an individual.").
10. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) ("We cannot
recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.").
11. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984); Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984).
12. The phrase originated in the motion picture, E.T.-The Extra-Terrestrial (Uni-
versal 1982), a motion picture which has enjoyed "extraordinary popularity." Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162, 1164 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Commentators report that no American film has had an impact similar to E.T.-The
Extra-Terrestrial. Made for i0.3 million dollars, the movie has grossed over 700 million
dollars in worldwide theatrical grosses and millions more in sales of merchandise. The No-
vember 1988 videocassette release of E.T.-The Extra-Terrestrial was a milestone in U.S.
entertainment. The advance orders-eleven million-were twice the number of the previous
best-selling film. By the end of 1988, 15 million copies of the videocassette were in the
hands of consumers. Schindette, E.T., PEOPLE Wm.v, Dec. 19, 1988, at 149-50.
The phrase, "E.T. Phone Home" and the character, E.T., are important sources of li-
censing revenues for owners of copyright in the motion picture. "With companies paying
Universal a reported average of seven percent of what they take in selling E.T. merchandise,
product royalties alone could recoup many times the $10.3 million spent to make the
movie." Kanner, On Madison Avenue: The Selling of E.T., NEw YORK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 15.
The size of the royalty arrangement for E.T. may be higher than seven percent. See E.T.
and Friends are Flying High, BusiNEsS WEEK, Jan. 10, 1982, at 77 ("Industry estimates are
that MCA's licensing subsidiary exacts about 15 percent in licensing fees."). It is no wonder,
therefore, that E.T. is phoning his attorneys, rather than home. See Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982). "This case represents
another example of Universal's aggressive protection of its copyright of the 'E.T.' charac-
ter." Briefs, 25 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 168 (1982) (PTCJ comment on Uni-
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and defendant use words. Coincidentally, one who asserts a propri-
etary right must demonstrate that the phrase, or the way that the
phrase is used, is so unique as to justify protection.
II. "You CAN'T JUDGE A BOOK By ITS COVER": USE OF THE
PHRASE AS AN ELEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
HYPOTHETICAL
An unknown screenwriter claims that the authors of E.T. in-
fringed her original screenplay about aliens. The works are dis-
similar but the defendant has borrowed the phrase "Phone
Home."
Infringement requires access' s and proof of substantial simi-
larity.'4 Not all similarities, however, amount to an infringement.'
Separate from the original work, many elements are unprotect-
able."6 For example, if two legal publishers use similar subject
headings, neither will be able to claim infringement on that basis
alone.17 Therefore, it is not enough to list the similarities, the
plaintiff must successfully assert a proprietary right to the
similarities.' 8
When comparing works, elements of substantial similarity fall
into two categories-literal similarities," such as word for word
13. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d
Cir. 1981); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1979). See also Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 271 (C.D. Cal. 1945)
(explaining that "[aiccess means that the person who is charged with pirating another's
work saw the first person's work.").
14. Substantial similarity means a taking that is "so 'material' or 'substantial' as to
constitute unlawful appropriation." Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d
Cir. 1946); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc. 528 F. Supp. 451, 461, (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(substantial similarity is demonstrated when an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as "having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.").
15. "[N]o bright line rule exists as to what quantum of similarity is permitted before
crossing into the realm of substantial similarity." Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Williams v. Baxter, 108 S. Ct. 346 (1987) (plaintiff alleged
that his work had been pirated to create the musical theme for the motion picture,
E. T.-The Extra- Terrestrial).
16. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930)
(holding that a playwright's copyright, for example, does "not cover everything that might
be drawn from her play; its content went to some extent into the public domain.").
17. State of Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacated, 559 F.
Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983)(holding statutory title headings to be mere descriptions which
could not be copyrighted).
18. When comparing works, a court will seek "sharp and central similarities." Fristot
v. First Am. Natural Ferns Co., 251 F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
19. Professor Nimmer, in his treatise, found it necessary to "invent" the terminol-
ogy-fragmented literal similarity and comprehensive non-literal similarity-in order to dis-
[Vol. 7:65
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copying, or non-literal similarities,20 such as the appropriation of a
distinctive plot or style. A literary work is a mosaic of these literal
and non-literal elements and each item that is poached has a value
by itself and a value in relation to the rest of the work. The more
unique the combination of elements and the more unexpected the
placement, the stronger the evidence of similarity.21
In Narrell u. Freeman,'2 the author of a social history of Jew-
ish migration to San Francisco asserted that factual details, histor-
ical events, and some phrases were duplicated in the defendant's
novel about a wealthy Jewish family. The defendant admitted con-
sulting the plaintiff's work and taking some phrases including
"hordes of gold seekers" and "rekindle old memories.' 2 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defend-
ant,2' concluding that the duplication of similar factual material
tinguish these two "quite different forms of similarity." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at Sec-
tion 13.031A][1]-[2]. Literal similarity, is generally an identical, though not "completely
word for word," copying. As Professor Nimmer indicated, the difficulty in using literal simi-
larity to prove substantial similarity is that often only fragments of a work, and not the
complete work, are literally copied. Id. For an application of Professor Nimmer's terminol-
ogy, see Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and Warner
Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
20. Although Professor Nimmer coined the phrase "comprehensive non-literal similar-
ity," see supra note 19, the underlying concept is based on Judge Learned Hand's "abstrac-
tions" theory, advanced in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of in-
creasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121 (citing Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899)). As Judge Hand recognized. a
play can be infringed absent any literal similarity of dialogue. "[The play] may often be
most effectively pirated by leaving out the speech, for which a substitute can be found."
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
21. It is the "particular subjective quality" of the combination of many different ele-
ments which may command copyright protection. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977). While one similarity may be triv-
ial, the overall impact and effect of many similar elements can justify a finding of substan-
tial similarity. Malkin v. Dubinsky, 146 F. Supp. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
22. 872 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
23. The defendant admitted copying the phrases " 'rekindle old memories,' 'staggering
network,' 'river wound its way between muddy banks crawling with alligatrs,' 'hordes of
goldseekers,' 'pitched overboard,' 'cow path,' 'shanties and corrugated [iron/steel] shacks...
were crowded together,' and 'beach was strewn with boxes, bales.'" Id. at 911.
24. Id. at 915. The Ninth Circuit uses a two part method for determining substantial
similarity; an objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic test. Id. at 912-13. When
analyzing two works of fiction, the Ninth Circuit will separate plot ideas (which are not
19891
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and ordinary phrases did not raise a triable issue of fact. The court
held that "[b]ecause of the fundamental differences between the
works and the insubstantial nature of the copied passages, no rea-
sonable reader could conclude that the works are substantially
similar." 5
In Litchfield v. Spielberg,6 the authors of E.T. were sued for
infringing an "unknown play" entitled Lokey From Maldemar2
The defendants acknowledged access but denied copying.28 The
only similarity was that in both works aliens with powers of levita-
tion and telepathy are stranded on earth; pursued by authoritarian
characters; and finally bid their earthly friends farewell.2  The
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not claim copyright pro-
tection for these general similarities.30
But what if the plaintiff in Litchfield also had used the phrase
"Phone Home" or "Lokey, Phone Home?" The character, Lokey,
is completely dissimilar to the character E.T.,3s and the plot, se-
quence, theme, mood, setting, and dialogue of defendant's work
were all dissimilar from the movie, E.T."2 As the Ninth Circuit in-
protected by copyright) from the actual concrete elements that make up the total sequence
of events and the relationships between the characters. Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289,
1293 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
25. Narrell, 872 F.2d at 913. In addition, the Ninth Circuit offered additional support
for its holding by finding that the taking amounted to fair use, Id. at 913-915, and that no
protected expression was copied. Id. at 910-912.
26. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
27. Id. Lokey from Maldemar is a musical play about the adventures of two aliens
(Lokey and Fudinkle). The plaintiff described her work as a social satire designed to illus-
trate the "disunity of man, so divided by egotism and all its manifestations of fear and
hate." Litchfield v. Spielberg, 26 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 226, 227 (C.D. Cal.
June 13, 1983)(case summary). E.T.-The Extra Terrestrial is a "children's tale about a boy
who finds, befriends and ultimately saves a little lost alien." Id.
28. Id. at 1355. The plaintiff's screenplay was rejected in 1979 by Universal Studios,
which eventually produced ET.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1357 (citing Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981)). Writing
about an alien temporarily stranded on earth is not a particularly unique or unexpected
combination of elements, so as to justify a finding of substantial similarity on that basis
alone. The "stranded alien" concept is a popular and re-occurring theme-e.g., the televi-
sion series My Favorite Martian or the motion picture Man Who Fell to Earth.
31. The district judge in dismissing the suit, noted that the character E.T. did not
infringe the plaintiffs copyright in her characters Lokey and Fudinkle. Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 26 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 226, 227 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 1983) (case
summary).
32. The court also found that E.T. did not employ the "overt and complex symbolism"
in Lokey from Maldemar. Id. There are varying views as to the value of dissimilarity in
determining infringement. See Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
241 (2d. Cir. 1983). The most appealing "subjective" standard is that advanced by Judge
Frankel: "There are differences and differences." Fristot v. First Am. Natural Ferns Co., 251
[Vol. 7:65
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dicated in Narell, if the works are dissimilar, the use of identical
phrases is not enough to rise to a finding of substantial similarity."3
A court would probably find the literal duplication to be so frag-
mented as to be de minimis.3 ' After finding de minimis similarities,
a court will decline to find infringement."
Would the determination be affected by the fact that the
phrase "Phone Home" was a material part of the defendant
Spielberg's work, was featured in advertising, and also was used for
merchandising purposes? The courts would answer the question in
the negative as the defendant's use of the appropriated phrase is
generally irrelevant to the determination of substantial simi-
larity.36
HYPOTHETICAL
What if the parties were reversed? What if the authors of E.T.
sued an unknown screenwriter attempting to produce a
Litchfield-like screenplay that used "Phone Home" or "Lokey,
Phone Home?"
Under this alternative hypothetical the result would probably
favor the plaintiffs because they had popularized the phrase. Un-
like the de minimis taking from an unknown play, taking the
phrase after it has been popularized, amounts to a "material" tak-
ing.3 7 Therefore, when the similarity of phrases arises, a plaintiff
F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
33. Narrell, 872 F.2d at 913.
34. Cf. Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Although often mislabeled as a fair use, the de minimis taking is excused on the basis of its
insubstantiality. 3 M. NIMMwR, supra note 6, at § 13.03[A]121. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 412, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744, n. 7, (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. E.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), off'd, 618 F.2d. 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (taking of three minor
elements from book about news event for use in movie is de minimis); Rokeach v. Avco
Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (taking of 100 words
from a 70,000 word book detailing mental health research for use in the movie The Ruling
Class is de minimis). But see Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F.
Supp. 741, 744, (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (taking of four musical notes
and words "I Love" is not de minimis).
36. Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 464 ("It is of no moment that one of the duplicated
sentences ultimately becomes a material part of [the defendant's] article, to wit, the title.").
Cf. Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (appropriated phrases
form a "major part of the last scene" of defendant's play). Similarly, the defense that "the
part copied was not a substantial part of the defendant's work" is a "much-criticized and
abandoned exception." Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Productions, 439 U.S. 1014 (1978).
37. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Industries, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
19891
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with a popular work will always have a stronger position than a
plaintiff with an unknown work."' When the exposure is as great as
with E.T., the "materiality" of key lines of dialogue is almost a
matter of judicial notice.39 Public acceptance of a literary phrase
from a larger work, therefore, invests that phrase with an element
of materiality that it previously could not possess.
III. "TELL 'Em GROUCHO SENT YA": USING THE PHRASE TO SELL
HYPOTHETICAL
Would it infringe the copyright on E.T. if an advertisement for a
long distance phone service used a photo of a young boy looking
toward outer space with the caption "Phone Home?"
Although there is a tenuous similarity between the phrase and
the photograph in the advertisement, a court in such a situation
may be influenced by the advertiser's use of the phrase for a pro-
motional rather than a narrative purpose."' In Dawn Associates v.
Links,"1 the plaintiff co-authored a screenplay, Night of the Living
Dead, which contained the phrase "When there is no room in
hell . .. the dead will walk the earth." The phrase also was used
in advertising for the motion picture.
The defendant owned a completely dissimilar film but used
the same phrase on movie posters in order to "palm off" his movie
as the plaintiff's.2 The district court determined that the use of
1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982). In Kamar, "I love you E.T." and "E.T. Phone Home" are protectable
because they "would be readily recognizable to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue from
the copyrighted movie." Id. at 1166. Similarly, the phrase "Look! ... Up in the sky! ...
It's a bird! ... It's a plane!" is a key line popularized through the exposure of Superman.
D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc. 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
38. The plaintiff in litigation such as Litchfield must overcome numerous hurdles
when litigating against TV and motion picture companies. See Rudell, Entertainment Law:
Copyright Infringement - Hurdles in Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1982 at 1, col. 1, ("IT]be
plaintiff faces the substantial out-of-pocket expenses involved in maintaining the action,
which must be balanced against the customary insurance protection acquired by defendants
against this type of claim.").
39. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162, 1165-66
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
40. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Court determinations are not the
only factors affecting advertising. An advertising campaign based on the "survivability" of a
line of luggage prompted the threat of an infringement suit from the owners of Raiders of
the Lost Ark. An arrangement for payment of a licensing fee was established and the matter
was settled out of court. Kanner, On Madison Avenue: The Soft Side of Luggage, NEW
YORK, Oct. 31, 1983, at 22.
41. 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
42. Id. at 833. "Horror aficionados stumbled upon [Night of the Living Dead] in run-
down theaters on New York's 42nd Street and in drive-ins in the sticks and soon spread the
word that they had discovered a masterpiece of the genre." D. PEARY, CULT MOVIEs 228
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the phrase was such an integral part of the plaintiff's film and pro-
motion that, for' purposes of a preliminary injunction, appropriat-
ing the phrase was a "substantial taking" so as to constitute
infringement.4
3
In DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc." the owner of the
copyright in Superman sued a chain store owner who had copied
the "trailer" to the Superman TV show.' 5 The unifying component
of this trailer is the phrase, "Look! . . . Up in the sky! . . . It's a
bird! . . . It's a plane . . . It's Superman!" The Court found the
taking -absent the use of the name Superman- to be "an unjus-
tifiable appropriation of copyrighted material for personal
profit."46 However, in Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcast-
ing Companies, Inc., the use of the phrase in a television comedy
did not result in a finding of infringement.47 The Court in the lat-
ter decision justified the distinction stating that "[no] matter how
well known a copyrighted phrase becomes, its author is entitled to
guard against its appropriation to promote the sale of commercial
products.""
In the traditional copyright infringement case, the infringing
work is directly distributed-i.e., the infringing song or novel is of-
fered to the public. But in situations like Dawn Associates and
Crazy Eddie, the phrase was used for its associative power to pro-
mote goods.' 9 The appropriation even may be interpreted as an en-
(1981).
43. Dawn Associates, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 835. The Court relied more on the fact that the
phrase was "an integral part of [plaintiff's] copyrighted advertising" than on the use of the
phrase in the plaintiff's screenplay. Id. at 835. The status of Romero's claim to the phrase
may now be in jeopardy. Apparently an error in the registration has dropped the film into
the public domain. Eder, P.D. Blues: How to Buy A Classic on Cassette, VILLAGE VOICE,
Sept. 16, 1986, at 37.
44. 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
45. The Superman "trailer" is the segment which introduces both the live action TV
series and the animated cartoon series. Id. at 1177-78.
46. Id. at 1178.
47. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 242.
49. The selling power of phrases or slogans on goods is undisputed in the twentieth
century. For this reason, they are protected under trademark law. See J. MCCARTHY, supra
note 6, at § 7:5. However, a slogan used as part of a trade label* may not be protected under
copyright principles. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972)
(phrase "the most personal sort of deodorant" not infringed by the phrase "the deodorant of
the most personal kind").
Titles of works, because of their secondary meaning, also may be protected under trade-
mark principles, although they generally are not protected under copyright. J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 6 at §§ 10:1-10:8. See also Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertain-
ment Industry, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 279 (1979); Netterville & Hirsch, Piracy and Privilege in
Literary Titles, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 101 (1959).
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dorsement. For example, a movie-goer viewing the posters at issue
in Dawn Associates, may assume mistakenly that George Romero
had participated in the production of the defendant's film,50 or a
consumer purchasing a bust of Martin Luther King, Jr. based upon
advertisements and other printed material containing segments of
Dr. King's speeches may assume mistakenly that the endorsement
was by Dr. King or his estate.'
Therefore, if a short phrase is used purely for its promotional
or associative commercial effect, as in the hypothetical phone ad-
vertisement, the court may accept less significant similarities to
justify a finding of copyright infringement.
IV. "POWER TO THE PEOPLE!": TAKING FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
HYPOTHETICAL
What success would the authors of E.T. have asserting a claim of
infringement against a songwriter who used the phrase "Phone
Home" repeatedly in a country and western song about divorce?
Popularizing a phrase may guarantee copyright protection
when the phrase is a key line of the plaintiffs work and is appro-
priated in connection with other elements from a work.2 But sepa-
rate from any connection with a larger work, literary phrases are
often assumed to be in the public domain for copyright purposes.53
For example, if the only similarity between two songs is a similar
phrase, such as "night and noon," 5' or "there will never be another
50. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D.
Pa. 1938) (noting that the use of three sentences from a scientist's work in a promotional
cigarette company pamphlet implies consent and is not excusable). This assumption of an
author's consent borders on the policies of French droit de suite in which the "artistic prod-
uct manifests the personality and thoughts of the creator. It bears his spirit, embodies his
reputation and reflects his views; the personality of the creator remains permanently a part
of the work." Hauser, The French Droit de Suite, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 14
(1962). But see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 n. 6, (2d Cir. 1984) (Claiming that the fear that use of a consumer magazine
review in a vacuum cleaner advertisement implies endorsement is "exaggerated.").
51. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The court was unsympathetic to claims of fair
use. Id. at 861. See also Salinger v. Random House, Inc 811 F.2d 90, 99, n. 6 (2d Cir. 1987)
(plaintiff Salinger contended that defendant's use of phrases inserted among close para-
phrases would confuse and deceive the public creating a cause of action for unfair
competition).
52. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162,
1165-66 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
53. See supra text accompanying note 6.
54. O'Brien v. Chappel & Co., 159 F. Supp. 58, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (refusing to recog-
nize an exclusive right to use the phrase "night and noon" in any and all contexts).
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you,"1 it will not be enough to justify a finding of substantial
similarity.
In Pendleton v. Acuif-Rose Publications, Inc.,5 the plaintiff's
country and western song contained the phrase, "I like to gamble, I
like to smoke. I like to drink and tell a dirty joke."5 The defend-
ant's song contained the phrase "She don't drink. She don't smoke.
She can't stand a dirty joke."58 The district court, acknowledging
that the phrases were not subject to copyright protection, granted
a summary judgment for the defendants. The court noted that
"the perfect country and western song has been described as in-
cluding drinking, mother, prisons, trains and trucks. This Court
can add to that list without reservation smoking, gambling, loving,
and telling dirty jokes.""
In Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp.,60 the plaintiff's copy-
right was for a musical composition, Mojo Workout, in which the
phrase "got my mojo working" was used repeatedly in variations."
The plaintiff also designed a dance, Do the Mojo, which aided in
the popularization of the composition." The defendant's copyright
was for a song entitled Got My Mojo Working.3 The music was
dissimilar. The notable similarity was the phrase "got my mojo
working."
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims of infringe-
ment' and noted that the defendants had known of the phrase
prior to the plaintiff's use.68 "As a figure of speech, the concept of
having, or not having, one's mojo working is not something in
55. Gingg v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. 56 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (re-
fusing to find the presence of a similar phrase in both works to be significant proof of
similarity).
56. 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
57. Id. at 939.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
61. Id. at 1397-98, nn. 3-5. "Mojo is ... one or more talismantic objects believed to
have power intrinsic to their nature, and believed able to impart power, or ward off evil or
misfortune.. ." Id. at 1396. The court acknowledged the ritual origins of "Mojo working" in
the rural South and determined that "MOJO is a commonplace part of the rhetoric of the
culture of a substantial portion of the American people." Id.
62. Id. at 1397 n.3. ("Wiggle and turn and away you go. That's the way you do the
mojo.").
63. Id. at 1400. This song, written by Preston (Red) Foster in 1956, has become the
more popular version, recorded by Muddy Waters, Jimmy Smith, Art Blakey, Johnny Riv-
ers, Sam the Sham and the Pharoahs, Manfred Mann, Conway Twitty, and others. Id. at
1400-02.
64. Id. at 1407.
65. Id. at 1403.
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which any one person could assert originality, or establish a propri-
etary right.""
In Gingg v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.,7 two songs
shared the same lyric lines - "There will be [many] other nights
like this" and "There will never be another you.""' The latter line
was also the title of both works. The plaintiff, who had less success
with her work, conceded that the phrase-title was not original with
herself and that there were "fourteen or fifteen songs entitled
There Will Never Be Another You, or at least substantially
similar."6
The court determined that "this element of similarity between
the two works has no significance.17 0 Asserting the public's right to
common romantic phrases, the court determined that "where the
title of a song deals with a romantic subject, it would be most un-
usual not to find the lyrics thereof including such works as 'nights,'
'moons,' 'lips,' 'kisses,' 'caresses,' and the like. 71
A defendant, in some circumstances, may be liable for taking a
public domain phrase from another work.72 "[T]hough the 'ordi-
nary' phrase may be quoted without fear of infringement, a copier
may not quote or paraphrase the sequence of creative expression
that includes such a phrase. 7 3 Similarly, if a lyrical phrase and its
underlying musical accompaniment is borrowed, this may justify a
finding of substantial similarity.
7'
66. Id. at 1396.
67. 56 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
68. Id. at 706. The chorus of the plaintiff's song started with the line "There'll be
other nights like this" and ended with the line "But there'll never be another you." The
defendant's chorus started with "there will be many other nights like this" and ended with
"There will never be another you." The last line of each composition also was found in the




72. "[The public) domain is open to all who tread it; not to those who invade the
closes of others, however similar." Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
Although finding that the defendant's musical accompaniment was substantially similar to
the plaintiff's, Judge Learned Hand refused to assess damages in Fisher, labeling the dam-
ages issue as "a mere point of honor, of scarcely more than irritation .... Except that it
raises an interesting point of law, it would be a waste of time for everyone concerned." Id. at
152.
73. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
213 (1987).
74. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), afl'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir. 1980) (two words and a four note sequence are the "heart
of the composition."); Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (combi-
nation of five-word phrase and music creates "the kind of sentiment ... that causes the
audiences to listen, applaud, and buy copies in the corridor on the way out of the theater.").
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However, as the decisions in Stratchborneo, Pendleton and
Gingg demonstrate, absent any other similarities, the presence of a
public domain phrase in both works is not enough to prove sub-
stantial similarity. A defendant will still avoid liability by demon-
strating a familiarity with the phrase, prior to acessing the plain-
tiff's work.75
V. "EUCLID ALONE HAS LOOKED ON BEAUTY BARE": PROTECTION
FOR A SINGULAR PHRASE
A. When the Phrase is Used in Conjunction with a Character
HYPOTHETICAL
Could the authors of E.T. prevent the copying of the phrase "E.T.
Phone Home" on a poster?
In an almost identical situation in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Kamar Industries, Inc.,76 use of the phrases "E.T. Phone
Home" and "I Love E.T." on drinking mugs, pencil sharpeners,
and other merchandise was held to be an infringement.7 One of
the two premises upon which the district court based its holding
was that the inscriptions on the defendant's products would be
"readily recognizable to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue
from the copyrighted movie."" a
Equally important, however, the court determined that the
plaintiff would have prevailed on its copyright claim simply by rea-
son of the defendant's unauthorized use of the E.T. character and
name. 79 The district judge ruled that copyright of the movie ex-
75. See supra notes 5, 6, 37 and 39 and accompanying text. This same approach was
followed in Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
where the defendant demonstrated familiarity with the word "Supercalifragilisticexpi-
alidocious" prior to publication of the plaintiff's song.
76. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
77. Id. at 1166. Kamar's president testified "that he never applies for merchandising
rights licenses because obtaining such licenses would be too expensive." Id. at 1165.
78., Id. at 1166. It is more probable that the protection stemmed from the use of the
character name, rather than the taking of dialogue. This would explain the Court's lack of
concern that the dialogue from the movie was "I love you, E.T." Kamar, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 1165, 1166. A second report of the case states that the defendant used the phrase
"I Love E.T." with the word love "symbolized by the picture of a heart." Copyright on
Motion Picture Extends to E.T. Character, 25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT. J. (BNA) 35
(1982).
79. Kamar, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1166. The Court first distinguished the pro-
tectability of the E.T. character and then extended that protection to include the name. Id.
The E.T. character also was protected separately in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. J.A.R.
Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (protecting E.T. likeness on dolls). For
a more thorough discussion on character protection in copyright law, see 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 6, at § 2.12 and Marks, The Legal Rights of Fictional Characters, 25 COPYRIGHT
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tends to the character name because it is central to the story.80
"The name 'E.T.' itself is highly distinctive and is inseparable
from the identity of the character. The use of the name ... con-
jures up the image and appeal of the E.T. character." 81 In so rul-
ing, E.T. joined the company of a select group of character names
protected under copyright.8 "
It is sensible to protect a phrase attached to a protected char-
acter.8 3 "Certain verbal tags also conjure up, by association, the
idea of specific characters: "It's a bird, it's a plane . . ."; "Elemen-
tary"; "Number One Son"; "Play it, Sam"; "Me Tarzan"; "Have
Gun Will Travel"; "Licensed to Kill"; "Keemosabee."",
The phrase "Phone Home," severed from the character name,
is unprotectable as a common idiom of language. When it is at-
tached to the name, however, the copyright of the motion picture
stretches, not only to protect the character, but to protect the
character-phrase association.8
B. When the Phrase is the Complete Work.
To the extent that a phrase is combined with other phrases,
the assembly or compilation of these phrases may effectuate copy-
right protection. For example, in University of Minnesota v. Ap-
plied Innovations, Inc.,8 6 the court protected short declarative
questions and statements used in a pyschometric personality test,
holding that the authors had used "sufficient intellectual labor in
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 35 (1975).
80. Kamar, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1166.
81. Id. at 1165.
8. See, e.g., Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159
(C.D. Cal. 1976) (protecting Tarzan, Jane, Boy, and Cheeta, or "any colorable imitation");
Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (protecting "Frank
Merriwell"). Because of the use of character names on merchandise, protection of character
names is more prevalent in trademark law. See generally Olin, The Administration of a
Character Program, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 76, 80-81 (1969) (documenting the difficulties of
foreign trademark registration when a resident of that country is named Donald Duck).
83. For example, "Me Tarzan, You Jane" is probably protectable under the ruling in
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
although the line occurs neither in the novel nor the MGM movies. Davidow, Copyright
Protection for Fictional Characters: A Trademark-Based Approach to Replace Nichols, 8
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 551 (1984).
84. Id. at 559 (1984).
85. Professor Nimmer states that the issue of whether a character is protectable apart
from the story is "more properly framed as relating to the degree of substantial similarity
required to constitute infringement rather than in terms of copyrightability per se." How-
ever, the increased use of characters in completely new works "renders it appropriate to
consider the copyrightability of a character..." I M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.12.
86. 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1689 (D. Minn 1987).
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assembling and revising or rewriting the test statements.""7 Simi-
larly, in Raffoler, Ltd. v. Peabody & Wright, Ltd.,s8 slogans such as
"Why are we giving away SOLEX Electric Toothbrush Sets For
Only $3?" and "This is NOT a misprint" were protected to the
extent of their arrangement and selection in plaintiff's
advertisements89
But what if a phrase is not derived from a larger work? Will
copyright ever protect it?90 The possibility has been explored most
notably by Judge Frank in Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc.91
In Heim, the issue arose as to whether the copying of a musical
phrase would be enough to justify infringement."2 Judge Frank de-
termined that lack of originality, not brevity, is what would pre-
vent -the separate copyrightability of a musical/literary phrase.9
This originality could be demonstrated by a phrase that was so
idiosyncratic that its appearance in another work would preclude
coincidence.' 4 Phrases such as "Euclid alone has looked on beauty
bare"" or "Twas brillig and the slithy toves"" exemplify this
standard.
As Judge Frank recognized in Heim, the degree of originality
required to protect a literary phrase differs from the degree of orig-
inality needed to validate a copyright.'7 Reflecting on the decision
87. Id. at 1696.
88. 671 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
89. Id. at 951.
90. In an age of licensing, this question is largely irrelevant. The merchandisable ele-
ments of a work, such as characters and phrases, demand exposure in a "narrative" setting
to sell licensed goods. "How much is a daily comic strip worth to Snoopy, a never-ending
series of movies to Star Wars, 90 minutes of TV time on Saturday morning to Smurfs?
Plenty." Green & Spragins, Smurfy to the Max, Foisms, Nov. 8, 1982, at 70. The need for a
popular movie or TV show to launch a merchandising campaign aimed at children is espe-
cially crucial for characters such as E.T. because "the boundary between reality and imagi-
nation in children is loose." Merchandise based on elements of a movie such as E.T. "may
permit the child to carry the fantasy of the show to reality permitting the child to become
part of the show." Grimes & Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69
TRADEMARK Rap. 431, 434 (1979) (citing the opinion of a psychiatrist, Dr. George Serban).
91. 154 F.2d 480 (2d. Cir. 1946).
92. Id. at 485.
93. Id. at.488. "Judge Frank was not discussing copyrightability but rather the extent
of copying necessary to establish an infringement." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.01[B]
n. 41.
94. Heim, 154 F.2d at 488.
95. Id. at 487 n.8.
96. Id. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
97. Heim, 154 F.2d at 488 n.17. Five years later, Judge Frank was to write the "classic
statement on the degree of 'originality' required for copyright." J. MCCARTHY, supra note 6,
at § 6:5. Judge Frank said, "[a]ll that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
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in Heim, Professor Nimmer has written: "It appears then, that
there is a reciprocal relationship between creativity and indepen-
dent effort. The smaller the effort (e.g. two words) the greater
must be the degree of creativity in order to claim copyright
protection."as
Obviously, terse statements such as "Contents Require Imme-
diate Attention" or "Gift Check Enclosed" do not exhibit sufficient
originality." But do statements of advertising copy, haikus, or
jokes, 00 all of which rely on brevity and simplicity, rise to the nec-
essary level of originality?
One example of the higher degree of creativity necessary for
copyright protection is evident in Brilliant v. W.B. Productions,
Inc.101 Ashleigh Brilliant is the author of literary phrases sold on
postcards.10 2 The defendant copied two phrases-"I may not be to-
tally perfect, but parts of me are excellent" and "I have abandoned
my search for truth and am now looking for a good fantasy"-and
altered a third phrase, all for sale on t-shirt transfers.'0
The court accepted the plaintiff's contention that the phrases
were epigrams,"0 " whose distinguishing features are conciseness,
something recognizably 'his own'." Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1951).
98. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.011B].
99. E.g., Magic Marketing, Inc. v. Mailing Services of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp.
769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
100. For an excellent discussion of the protection of jokes, see Herman, The
Copyrightability of Jokes: "Take My Registration Deposit ... Please!," 6 COMM/ENT. L.J.
392 (1984)
101. Civ. No. 79-1893-WMB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1979).
102. Titled Brilliant Thoughts, the author illustrated, published, and separately copy-
righted these works (registered as composite works because they included illustrations). As
of 1979, Brilliant had 1,400 works in print (over 50,000,000 cards). The works also are col-
lected in book form. The author followed certain rules of style when creating his work. No
epigram was longer than 17 words. "[Tihe words must be simple, easily understood, easily
translatable ... land their effect] must not in any way depend upon rhyme, rhythm, puns or
any other kind of cultural word-play." A. BRILLIANT, I MAY NOT BE TOTALLY PERFECT 12
(1979).
103. Judgment, Brilliant v. W.B. Productions, Inc., Civ. No. 79-1893-WMB (S.D. Cal.
entered Oct. 22, 1979). Brilliant also successfully asserted his rights against Universal City
Studios (E.T.'s copyright owner) when "I May Not Be Perfect . . ." appeared on a t-shirt
worn in a television movie of the week. For tales of his other legal battles see A. BRILLIANT,
supra note 102.
104. The plaintiff and his counsel had referred to the works as epigrams in order to
demonstrate that there was a tradition and art involved in literary phrases. Brilliant had
established a continuing craft in these short works. "[Vlery few writers in our language
(apart from the pitiable hacks of the greeting card industry) have ever devoted themselves
to creating an extended series of such works." A. BRILLIANT, supra note 102, at 11. Labelling
the works epigrams also helped distinguish the works from ideas, which are unprotectable.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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cleverness, and a pointed observation. The Court determined that
the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in two in-
stances.105 By fulfilling the higher creative standards of an epi-
gram, the literary phrases in Brilliant also satisfied the inverse re-
lationship between originality and length discussed by Judge
Frank and Professor Nimmer.'"
VI. "TwAs BRILLIG AND THE SLITHY TovEs": PROTECTING THE
INVENTED PHRASE
HYPOTHETICAL
If a college student created a new language and popularized it
among other students, could she then sell t-shirts bearing a trans-
lation of "Phone Home" in that language?
In Brilliant, the clever arrangement of a small group of words
established the required degree of originality. However, arrange-
ment of words is not the only means of demonstrating originality
in a short phrase. Evidence of creativity also is demonstrated by
the use of inventive words or language.10 7 This is exemplified by
Judge Frank's citation from Jabberwocky-"Twas brillig and the
slithy toves."' 8 A similar style of nonsense "code words" prompted
Judge Learned Hand to write, "Conceivably there may arise a poet
who strings together words without rational sequence-perhaps
even coined syllables-through whose beauty, cadence, meter and
rhyme he may seek to make poetry." 1 9
105. Judgment at 13, Brilliant v. W.B. Productions, Inc., Civ. No. 79-1893-WMB (S.D.
Cal. entered Oct. 22, 1979). A third epigram, Brilliant's "I'm in search of myself - Have you
seen me anywhere?" had been altered to "I'm trying to find myself ... Have you seen me
lately?" This work was not protected, perhaps indicating that actionable copying requires
exact literal duplication.
106. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. "With so limited a format, the
challenge was to pack the most possible insight, amusement, intelligence, and feeling into
the fewest possible words." Cf. A. BRILLIANT, supra note 102, at 12.
107. "[T]hey may be the productions of high ingenuity or even genius." Reiss v. Na-
tional Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See also Life Music, Inc. v.
Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (copying an inventive word
"conceivably" could create liability); and Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consulting Int'l, Ltd.
[1981] 2 All E.R. 495, 504 (although refusing to protect 'Exxon' under copyright, the British
court indicated a willingness to protect inventive words in certain contexts).
The protection of invented languages has become a particularly important issue for au-
thors of computer software, an industry in which computer languages and their phrasing are
"essential to man-machine communication." Wiegner & Heins, Can Las Vegas sue Atlantic
City, FORBES, Mar. 6, 1989, at 130.
108. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1946).
109. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (pro-
tecting a book of meaningless code words).
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Lewis Carroll's highly inventive Jabberwocky language was
also cited in the British case, Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consult-
ing Int'l Ltd."0 Hypothesizing that Lewis Carroll recently had
written the poem, the British court concluded that the author
would be able to protect against the copying of the word "Jabber-
wocky" by another. However, "the judge observed that if Carroll
had merely invented the word and had never written the famous
poem which contained it, it would be questionable whether he
could have successfully contended that he had copyright in the
word alone." ''
Based upon these decisions, the creator of an original language
would be able to protect original expressions using that language.
Absent the language, it would be more difficult to protect a single
invented word. However, determining whether a translation of the
phrase "E.T. Phone Home" into an invented language is protect-
able requires examining a second issue, namely, whether such
translations are non-infringing. A common factor in both "Jabber-
wocky" and the "code word case""' was that the words in both
had no "meaning."" l3
Once the words of an invented language have a translatable
meaning, using that language to express a copyrighted work be-
comes an infringement because "[tihe translation may not lawfully
come into being without the consent of the copyright owner of the
work to be translated."' 14 Therefore, the hypothetical college stu-
dent who creates a new language may be able to protect against
others copying the language, but will not be able to use the lan-
guage to shield against infringement when translating protected
works such as "E.T. Phone Home."
110. [19811 2 All E.R. 495, 504.
111. Bigger, Notes From Other Nations, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 170, 172 (1981).
112. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
113. "These words have a prospective meaning, but as yet they have not received it,
like an empty pitcher." Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
114. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 8.09[B][11. See Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf
Publishers Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that the copying of a work by
Jean Genet indirectly through copying a translation of the original is an infringement). In
another case, the transliteration of Arabic words (creating a phonetic spelling with roman
letters) does not possess sufficient originality to merit copyright protection. Signo Trading
Int'l, Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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VII. "TEACHER'S PET": THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
HYPOTHETICAL
Would the use of the phrase, "E.T. Phone Home" in a book of
film quotations qualify as a fair use?
Copying a phrase for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research commonly quali-
fies as a fair use. 1 ' In determining whether the reproduction quali-
fies as a fair use, several factors are considered."'
The first factor is the "purpose and character of the use.'11 7 A
profitable use does not prevent a fair use defense from suc-
ceeding." 8 "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
whether the sole motive of the use is a monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price.""'
The second factor is the "nature of the copyrighted work."' °
Certain types of works, typically those involving more of diligence
than of originality or inventiveness require less copyright protec-
tion than other original works.' In addition, the fact that a work
is unpublished is a critical element of its nature.' 2'
The third factor in determining fair use is the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work.123 In Salinger
115. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). "[Slome idea of the sort of activities the courts might
regard as fair use under the circumstances: quotations of excerpts in a review or criticism for
purposes of illustration or comment; quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical
work ...." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th CONG., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5678 [hereinafter 1976 HOUSE REPORT].
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 which states:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. This set of criteria is not "definitive or determinative," but merely "some gauge for
balancing the equities." 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 115, at 65.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988). "The intent of this section is to encourage users to
engage in activities the primary benefit of which accrues to others." Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at §
13.05[A][1].
121. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). If the statutory factor were phrased as a question it might ask: is
the plaintiffs work "primarily informational rather than creative?"
122. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
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v. Random House, Inc.,124 the Second Circuit measured this factor
quantitatively and qualitatively. 28 Although many "ordinary
phrases" appeared within the plaintiff's letters, the court neverthe-
less determined that each passage as a whole satisfied the thresh-
old of required creativity. Therefore, the paraphrasing of the let-
ters constituted infringement. 2
The fourth and "single most important element of fair use "127
is the effect of the use upon the potential market' 2 or the value of
the copyrightable work. 29 In Salinger, for example, the court de-
termined that an appreciable number of readers of the defendant's
book would have the impression "that they have read Salinger's
words, perhaps not quoted verbatim, but paraphrased so closely as
to diminish interest in purchasing the originals."'
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,"'
the Supreme Court grappled with the pre-publication appropria-
tion of President Ford's memoirs. The actual number of words and
phrases borrowed were small,3 2 but the fact that the defendant's
work was timed to "scoop" the plaintiff's publication seriously
124. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
125. Id. at 99 (noting that quoted or paraphrased portions of the plaintiff's unpub-
lished letters were featured in forty percent of the defendant's book's 192 pages).
126. Id.
127. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
128. In Salinger, the fact that the author had disavowed any intention to publish the
letters during his lifetime did not lessen the potential market. The court stated that Salin-
ger was entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his letters, an opportunity estimated to
have a value in excess of $500,000. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988). This factor is "aimed at the copier who attempts to
usurp the demand for the original work." Consumers Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). This also includes consideration of the effect of the use
on the "potential market" for the copyrighted work. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In making this determina-
tion, a court also may consider whether or not the plaintiff's work is still "in print" and
available. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986).
130. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99. In addition, the court took offense as to how inade-
quately the defendant paraphrased Salinger's expression. For example, Salinger's statement
about how an editor rejected his story, "She's a beautiful girl, except for her face," was
rephrased by defendant as "How would a girl feel if you told her she was stunning to look at
but that facially there was something not quite right about her?" Id. at 99 n.5.
On this basis, the Second Circuit determined that the factors weighed against the de-
fendant, despite the recognizable scholarly purpose of the defendant's use. By preventing
the use of his unpublished letters, Salinger secured a right "that many writers would rather
not have - the right not to publish." Hoban, The Salinger File, NEw YORK MAGAZINE, June
15, 1987, at 36, 42.
131. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
132. The defendant produced a 2,250 word article. Approximately 300 to 400 words of
it consisted of verbatim quotes taken from the plaintiff's manuscript. Id. at 539.
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damaged the marketability of the first serialization rights.'33 The
Supreme Court held that "isolated instances of minor infringe-
ments when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a ma-
jor inroad on copyright that must be prevented. '"I 4
In analyzing the E.T. hypothetical, a factor by factor analysis
of all potential fair uses is necessary. As to the first fac-
tor-purpose of the use-considerations would weigh in favor of
the defendant as a film quotation book would qualify as a schol-
arly, although commercial, work.
The second factor-nature of the copyrighted work-would
weigh in favor of the authors of E.T. as the film is a work of origi-
nality or inventiveness, rather than one simply involving diligence.
The third factor-amount and substantiality of the portion
used-requires a threshold determination. How is a derivative but
copyrightable phrase like "E.T. Phone Home" measured in rela-
tion to the motion picture? If the phrase is measured against the
motion picture screenplay, the phrase would amount to a material,
but proportionately small, part of a larger work.1
5
But if the phrase is considered as a separately copyrightable
work, the taking of three words would be substantial. Like the de-
fendants in Brilliant v. W.B. Productions, Inc.'3 6 or Sony Corpora-
tion of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,'- 7 the defendant in
the hypothetical would be in the position of justifying the taking of
a complete work." 8
As for the fourth factor-effect on the market-the use of this
key line of dialogue in a film quotation book would not displace
the potential market for the motion picture.
Therefore, the taking of a derivative phrase like "E.T. Phone
Home" offers the court an option in fair use. Although separately
copyrightable for purposes of cups, posters, and pencil sharpeners,
the phrase still can be considered a segment, albeit material part,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 569.
135. The taking would amount to an excerpt or quotation, excusable if used for schol-
arly purposes. See 1976 HousE RzPORT, supra note 115, at 65. Even the use of 29 material
words for a non-scholarly, promotional purpose can be excusid as a fair use. Consumers
Union of U.S. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983).
136. Judgment, Brilliant v. W.B. Productions, Inc., Civ. No. 79-1893-WMB (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 22, 1979).
137. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
138. "[C]omplete duplication... might alone be sufficient to preclude a finding of fair
use." Id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington,
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981) ("The admitted reprinting of approximately 92
percent of plaintiff's story precludes the fair use defense under prior law.").
1989]
21
Stim: E.T. Phone Home: The Protection of Literary Phrases
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
86 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
of a larger work.
The use of small but important segments of works poses a di-
lemma for the user. A conservative approach would require the
payment of "user fees" for small segments that might, under actual
judicial scrutiny, be considered a fair use.' A less conservative ap-
proach would be to "cite and fight.""" Because fair use is based
upon a "concept of reasonableness' ' 4 1 the use of "E.T. Phone
Home" in a film quotation book therefore should be excused as a
fair use.""
VIII. "HE WHO LAUGHS LAST, LAUGHS BEST": THE PARODY
DEFENSE
HYPOTHETICAL
Would it be justifiable under a fair use defense, for an artist to
sell postcards with a photo of Idi Amin and the phrase, "Idi
Phone Home?""
The parody defense, although considered a branch of the fair
use doctrine,"' has acquired its own factors and characteristics.1
5
By its nature, parody demands some taking from an original
139. Some readers may wonder whether E.T.'s proprietor would oppose a scholarly or
otherwise critical use of the phrase or character. However, the use of the E.T. character for
traditional fair use purposes such as political cartoons and copy has caused one representa-
tive of Universal to gripe, "We're flattered by the imitation, but that's pirating, not licens-
ing." Kanner, On Madison Avenue: The Selling of E.T., NEw YORK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 15, 16.
140. Rolling Stone Magazine faced such a dilemma in its use of song lyrics in feature
articles and reviews. "The law is very vague ... [s]o we made up some rules ... a lyric of
four lines or over but under one-fifth of a song must be cited, but permission need not be
asked, defining under one-fifth of a song as a fair use . .." Over one-fifth of the song lyrics
requires obtaining permission from the copyright owner. Belz, Unwriting the Story of Rock,
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 36, 41-42 (Lawrence & Timberg, eds.) (1980) (citing letter,
Sara Lazin, Associate Editor, ROLLING STONE, April 6, 1978).
141. Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560 (D.D.C. 1981).
142. This result would not necessarily follow if an author wanted to use one frame of a
motion picture. Although a single frame would be 1/172,800 of a two hour movie, the visual
aspect of a film poses copyright problems. The author of a scholarly work on films may find
it difficult to understand why a fee must be paid. The request for such fees often "has little
to do with [copyright] principles and everything to do with finance. [Film owners] reason
that because they own the film, they are entitled to a 'piece of the action'...." Mast, Film
Study and Copyright Law, in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 72, 77 (Lawrence & Timberg eds.
1980).
143. Parody is considered a fair use defense. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 115 at
65.
144. "The 'parody' branch of the 'fair use' doctrine is itself a means of fostering the
creativity protected by the copyright law." Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
720 F.2d 231. 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
145. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at 13.05[C] for a discussion of the approaches
developed in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
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work."' A "more extensive use of another's copyrighted work"" 7 is
permitted, therefore, in order to "conjure up" the original."" Pro-
fessor Nimmer, in his treatise, indicates that satire "may justify
the defense of fair use even where substantial similarity exists."' 4
The key to determining a successful parody defense is whether the
defendant's result had "neither the intent nor the effect of fulfil-
ling the demand for the original.'
5 0
In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,' 5' a late-
night TV comedy show parodied the musical phrase "I Love New
York" using the words "I Love Sodom. '15  Only the words "I
Love" and four musical notes were taken from the plaintiff's work,
yet the court recognized the musical-lyrical phrase as the "heart of
the composition' ' 5 3 and considered such a taking as "capable of
rising to the level of a copyright infringement.''5 Having deter-
mined this, the court examined whether the defendant's use
"tended to interfere with the marketability of the copyrighted
work."155 The court determined that "the defendant's version of
146. The taking of phrases is often necessary to create a parody. Berlin v. E.C. Publi-
cations, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). Similarly, the
taking of a small amount of dialogue also is permitted for purposes of burlesque. Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
147. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir. 1980).
148. One test of infringement in parody is whether the defendant has taken more than
necessary to "recall or conjure up" the original. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544. The court in El-
smere recognized that the ability to conjure up the original was necessary because a "parody
frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original ...... Elsmere, 623 F.2d
at 253 n.1. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that when
conjuring up the original, a parodist can do more than evoke an initial recognition in the
listener).
149. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 13.05[C].
150. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
151. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
152. The plaintiff's work had been created as part of a promotional campaign to en-
courage tourism in New York State. Id. at 745.
153. Id. at 744.
154. Id. The plaintiff in Elsmere argued that the parody defense was invalid because
the TV song did not satirize the subject matter of the original, i.e., the TV show did not
parody the song I Love New York or its subject matter. Id. The TV skit satirized the
problems of a modern city like New York by hypothesizing a promotional campaign for the
biblical city of Sodom. The song I Love New York, however, promoted the state of New
York, not the city. Id. at 745-46. Although finding identity, the court disagreed with the
requirement, maintaining that a lack of identity does not preclude a finding of fair use. Id.
at 746. This argument is often accepted in sexually explicit parodies. See MCA, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified and affirmed, 677 F.2d 180 (1981); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
155. Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 747. Parody, as a form of fair use, shares similar statu-
tory concerns. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
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the jingle has not competed in the least with or detracted from the
plaintiff's work."156
In Fisher v. Dees,'57 the composers of the song When Sunny
Gets Blue claimed that their song was infringed by When Sonny
Sniffs Glue, a twenty-nine second parody which altered the origi-
nal lyric line "5 8 and borrowed six bars of the plaintiff's music.
In analyzing whether the defendant's use interfered with the
marketability of the plaintiffs' work, the court noted that:
[Tihe economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned
is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the
original-any bad review can have that effect-but rather
whether it fulfills the demand for the original. Biting criticism
suppresses demand; copyright infringement usurps it.13'
Finding the facts similar to those in Elsmere,160 the court
weighed the parodist's license against the rights of the copyright
holder and determined that the "balance tips in the parodist's
favor."'""
Applying a similar standard, the use of "Idi Phone Home", de-
spite its phonetic literal similarity, should not amount to an in-
fringement. Initially, its deviation from the separately protectable
"E.T. Phone Home" might be enough to excuse the copying. The
defendant could argue that all that was literally copied was the
public domain phrase "Phone Home." The plaintiff would have to
prove either that "Idi Phone Home" was a phonetic literal similar-
ity or that the copyrighted work was comprehensively copied,
rather than literally.1
62
Second, even if a substantial similarity existed, the taking
would be excused because the work is only interposing that which
is free to all with something incongruous.6 s The parody had
"neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the
original."' 4 Despite the "stranded character"' 6 analogy, the come-
156. Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. at 747.
157. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
158. The plaintiffs' song used the phrase, "When Sunny gets blue, her eyes get gray
and cloudy, then the rain begins to fall." Defendant's composition used the phrase, "When
Sonny sniffs glue, her eyes get red and bulgy, then her hair begins to fall." Id. at 434.
159. Id. at 438.
160. Id. at 439 n.5.
161. Id. at 439.
162. The latter argument is difficult to make with literary phrases. See supra note 104.
163. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964).
164. Id. "Infringement occurs when a parody supplants the original in markets the
original is aimed at, or in which the original is or has reasonable potential to become, com-
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dic objective of the Idi Amin postcard is unrelated to the motion
picture. Finally, "Idi Phone Home" would not compete with or de-
tract from the motion picture copyright. Within such cramped
quarters, therefore, a separately copyrightable phrase can be
parodied.
IX. CONCLUSION
Judge Frank's observation in Heim V. Universal Pictures Co.,
Inc.'" remains the most insightful guideline for the protection of
short phrases-a literary phrase must be so idiosyncratic that its
appearance in another work would preclude coincidence.16 7 What
produces this idiosyncrasy? In parody, it is the interposition of
something familiar with something incongruous. In a character
phrase, such as "E.T. Phone Home," it is the inseparable associa-
tion between the words and the fictional personality. In an epi-
gram, it is the demonstration of a highly structured creativity.'"
"There's a great power in words," wrote one observer, "if you
don't hitch too many of them together."' 69 This power is one of
suggestion rather than explanation. It manifests itself as humor,




The courts are prepared to reward the authors of these works,
but in order to protect them, the question must be asked, as in the
protection of characters: Has enough development gone into the
work so that a line can be drawn separating the author's expression
from that which is in the public domain?1 2 Wherever this line is
mercially valuable." Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1986).
165. Both E.T. and Idi were separated from their native homes and both sought to
return.
166. 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
167. Id. at 488.
168. "The casual reader of [my] works is not usually aware of the high degree of disci-
pline upon which they are based." A. BRILLIANT, supra note 102, at 12.
169. QUOTATION DICTIONARY 38 (1969) (quoting Josh Billings).
170. Often that insight is into the creative process itself. By searching for "the happy
phrase, that will give expression to the thought.... the thought itself is transfigured by the
phrase when found." B. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 (1924).
171.
[H]aiku poems with a whole world of meaning all shut up in seventeen syllables,
- just the flash of a picture as if a window has been suddenly opened upon some
beautiful scene and then as suddenly closed again, - just a flash, and all the rest
left for him who hears, to imagine and to feel.
LrrrILE PICTURES OF JAPAN 163 (1952) (O.B. Miller ed.).
172. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
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drawn, it will seem arbitrary, but "that is no excuse for not draw-
ing it . ..173 If an author has created a uniquely suggestive work,
such as "E.T. Phone Home," then the courts will protect it under
copyright. But if an author's literary phrase is merely a trivial vari-
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